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There	is	little	evidence	the	EU’s	post-crisis	economic
governance	regime	has	moved	in	a	more	‘social’
direction
Following	the	2008	financial	crisis,	the	European	Union	adopted	a	new
economic	governance	regime.	As	Jamie	Jordan,	Vincenzo	Maccarrone
and	Roland	Erne	explain,	some	scholars	have	argued	that	this	new	regime
places	greater	emphasis	on	social	objectives.	Drawing	on	a	new	study	of
labour	policy	interventions	in	Germany,	Ireland,	Italy	and	Romania	between
2009	and	2019,	they	demonstrate	that	this	is	not	the	case,	with	EU
interventions	continuing	to	be	shaped	by	a	liberalisation	agenda.
Until	recently,	wage	policy	remained	a	national	issue.	Accordingly,	European	labour	politics	has	mainly	been
shaped	by	pressures	triggered	by	the	creation	of	the	Single	Market	and	European	Monetary	Union.	After	the	2008
financial	crisis,	however,	economic	integration	has	been	complemented	by	integration	effected	through	the	direct
surveillance	of	member	states.	While	the	initial	focus	of	the	EU’s	New	Economic	Governance	regime	(NEG)	on
austerity	is	uncontested,	an	influential	stream	of	EU	social	policy	literature	argues	that	since	2013	there	has	been
more	emphasis	on	social	objectives.
In	a	new	study,	we	show	that	this	is	not	the	case.	We	do	so	through	an	in-depth	analysis	of	economic	governance
on	wage,	job	protection	and	collective	bargaining	policy	in	Germany,	Italy,	Ireland	and	Romania	between	2009	and
2019.	Our	main	conclusion	is	that	the	EU’s	interventions	in	these	areas	continue	to	be	dominated	by	a	liberalisation
agenda	that	is	commodifying	labour,	albeit	to	a	different	degree	across	the	economically	uneven	but	nonetheless
politically	integrated	EU.	Even	so,	our	contextualised	analysis	enables	us	to	detect	contradictions	that	provide
labour	movements	with	opportunities	for	countervailing	action.	After	a	decade	of	commodifying	policies,	in	January
2020	the	new	European	Commission	would	hardly	have	launched	the	legislative	process	for	a	new	proposal	on	fair
minimum	wages	in	the	EU	were	there	not	a	growing	concern	about	wages	that	are	too	low	to	guarantee	a	decent
standard	of	living.
Understanding	the	EU’s	New	Economic	Governance	in	context
Whilst	we	recognise	advances	in	EU	studies	that	improve	our	understanding	of	the	EU’s	new	economic
governance,	most	studies	of	social	policy	are	characterised	by	three	limitations.	Firstly,	those	who	argue	that	there
has	been	a	partial	but	persistent	‘socialisation’	of	economic	governance	only	focus	on	a	selection	of	Country-
Specific	Recommendations	(CSRs)	and	exclude	other	governance	mechanisms	from	the	analysis,	i.e.	the
Memorandums	of	Understanding	(MoUs)	signed	by	countries	receiving	EU	loans.	We	therefore	also	include	MoUs
in	our	analysis.
Secondly,	supporters	of	the	socialisation	thesis	give	equal	weighting	to	all	CSRs	regardless	of	their	legal	bases,
ignoring	whether	they	relate	to	an	MoU,	the	Stability	and	Growth	Pact	(SGP),	the	Macroeconomic	Imbalance
Procedure	(MIP)	or	the	Europe2020	agenda.	Instead,	we	analyse	the	varied	levels	of	constraint	that	accompany
policy	prescriptions	and	recommendations	over	each	annual	cycle.	First,	we	distinguish	the	level	of	supervision	that
a	member	state	finds	itself	under,	e.g.	the	quarterly	reviews	regarding	an	MoU	or	the	in-depth	reviews	regarding	an
excessive	deficit	or	macroeconomic	imbalance.	Table	1	shows	the	status	each	country	under	study	was
experiencing	within	this	governance	regime	between	2009	and	2019.
Table	1:	Country	status	within	the	EU’s	NEG	policy	enforcement	regime
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Source:	Council	recommendations	on	national	reform	programmes	(2011-2019).	a	The	revised	SGP	and	the	new	MIP	process	came
into	force	in	2012.	SGP	(Stability	and	Growth	Pact):	EDP	(Excessive	Deficit	Procedure);	Significant	Deviation	Procedure	(SDP).	MIP
(Macroeconomic	Imbalance	Procedure):	Ex-IMB	(Excessive	Imbalance),	IMB	(Imbalance).	MoU	(Memorandum	of	Understanding	on
Financial	Assistance):	P-MoU	(Precautionary	MoU).
The	impact	of	economic	governance	procedures,	however,	not	only	depends	on	the	level	of	supervision	that	a
member	state	is	facing.	Equally	important	are	the	weak,	significant	or	very	significant	sanctions	that	a	noncomplying
state	would	risk,	depending	on	the	origin	of	a	specific	policy	prescription	or	recommendation,	as	outlined	in	Table	2.
Table	2:	Origin	and	degree	of	constraint	of	NEG	prescriptions
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Source:	Adapted	from	Stan	and	Erne	(2018). 	a	EU	Financial	Assistance	to	a	member	state	is	conditional	on	the	implementation	of	the
corresponding	MoU.	b	Since	2014,	European	Structural	and	Investment	funding	to	all	EU	member	states	is	conditional	on	‘sound
economic	governance’,	i.e.	the	implementation	of	corrective	EAP-,	SGP-,	and	MIP-prescriptions	(Article	23,	Regulation	No	1303/2013
of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	of	17	December	2013).	c	Since	2011,	a	member	state	of	the	euro	area	that	has	not
‘taken	effective	action	to	correct	its	excessive	[budget]	deficit’,	risks	‘a	fine,	amounting	to	0,2	%	of	the	Member	State’s	GDP	in	the
preceding	year.’	(Art.	6,	Regulation	No	1173/2011	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	of	16	November	2011).	d	Since	2011,
a	member	state	of	the	euro	area	that	‘has	not	taken	the	corrective	action	[against	excessive	macroeconomic	imbalances]
recommended	by	the	Council’	risks	an	‘annual	fine	of	0,1	%	of	the	GDP	in	the	preceding	year	of	the	Member	State	concerned’	(Art.
2,	Regulation	No	1174/2011	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	of	16	November	2011).
Further,	in	order	to	be	able	to	assess	the	social	trajectory	of	European	economic	governance,	Table	3	below
distinguishes	different	trajectories	in	three	areas	based	on	their	commodifying	or	decommodifying	content.	For
wage	policy,	there	is	a	simple	division	between	wage	level	increases	and	restraints.	For	labour	market	institutions,
there	is	a	focus	on	whether	there	is	a	call	to	increase	or	decrease	workers’	employment	protections.	For	collective
bargaining,	we	distinguish	between	policies	that	favour	solidaristic	or	individualising	bargaining	institutions.	We
define	bargaining	institutions	as	solidaristic	if	they	are	taking	wages	and	working	conditions	out	of	competition
through	the	setting	of	standards	that	apply	to	multiple	employers.	By	contrast,	collective	bargaining	policy
recommendations	are	commodifying	labour	if	they	call	for	a	decentralisation	of	multi-employer	collective	bargaining
agreements.
Table	3:	Policy	trajectories	and	themes	of	NEG	prescriptions
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Source:	Our	Analysis	of	Council	Recommendations	on	National	Reform	Programmes	(2009-19)	including	the	MoUs	quoted	in	them.
See	online	annexe.
Finally,	decontextualised	studies	also	often	disregard	where	the	receiving	state	is	situated	within	the	EU’s	combined
but	uneven	political	economy.	There	is	no	attempt	to	understand,	let	alone	explain,	why	a	specific	set	of	policies
may	be	targeted	at	a	member	state	at	a	given	point	in	time.	Therefore,	we	analyse	the	content	of	the	EU’s	NEG
regime	only	in	relation	to	a	set	of	four	member	states	as	opposed	to	all	28	(at	the	time),	but	in	much	more	depth,
including	two	larger	countries,	Germany	and	Italy,	as	well	as	two	smaller	ones,	Ireland	and	Romania.	We	chose	to
study	these	four	countries	as	proxies	for	the	relative	power	of	larger/smaller	and	richer/poorer	states	in	the	EU	in
order	to	be	able	to	capture	the	national	and	transnational	dynamics	that	are	at	work.
2009-2019:	No	social	orientation	of	economic	governance	in	the	area	of	industrial	relations
The	results	of	our	analysis	are	summarised	in	Table	4	below.	They	distinguish	between	decommodifying	and
commodifying	trends,	as	well	as	between	very	significant	(black),	significant	(grey)	and	weak	(white)	degrees	of
constraints	depending	on	its	particular	policy	area,	its	timing,	and	the	country	position	in	the	EU’s	political	economy.
Ultimately,	our	analysis	shows	that	there	has	been	no	socialisation	of	the	EU’s	NEG	regime	between	2009	and
2019	in	the	policy	fields	and	countries	under	study.
Table	4:	EU	prescriptions	on	wages,	employment	protection,	and	collective	bargaining
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Source:	Our	Analysis	of	Council	Recommendations	on	National	Reform	Programmes	(2009-19)	including	the	MoUs	quoted	in	them.
See	online	annexe.
For	Italy,	there	was	a	continuing	insistence	on	both	the	commodification	of	job	protection	laws	and	wage	bargaining
decentralisation,	despite	the	implementation	of	several	major	labour	market	reforms	since	2012.	In	2018,	however,
the	issue	of	bargaining	decentralisation	was	dropped.	But	this	did	not	happen	due	to	a	higher	sensitivity	to	social	or
local	concerns,	as	the	Commission	in	its	‘Country	Report’	continued	to	call	the	efforts	on	decentralisation
insufficient.	The	recommendation	was	dropped	only	after	the	Employment	Committee	of	the	Council	evaluated	the
level	of	decentralisation	achieved	by	the	Italian	reforms	as	enough.
The	MoU	for	Romania	called	for	major	wage	cuts	and	a	commodification	of	individual	and	collective	labour	law.	This
would	suggest	that	there	would	be	no	need	for	further	new	prescriptions	after	the	acute	phase	of	the	crisis.	In	2013,
however,	the	EU	started	to	worry	about	the	increases	in	public	sector	and	minimum	wages	that	the	new	Social
Democratic	government	promised	to	implement	unilaterally.	In	June	2017,	the	Council	opened	a	Significant
Deviation	Procedure	(SDP)	that	meant	that	the	government	had	to	take	decisive	action	to	ensure	that	the	nominal
growth	rate	of	net	primary	government	expenditure	would	not	exceed	3.3%	in	2017.	In	turn,	the	Social	Democratic
government	counteracted	its	own	wage	increases	with	a	new	law	that	shifted	most	social	security	taxes	of
employers	to	their	employees.	Since	2018,	the	public	sector	and	minimum	wage	increases	have	thus	effectively
been	financed	by	the	employees	themselves,	given	the	savings	for	public	and	private	employers	created	by	this	‘tax
revolution’.
For	Ireland,	the	MoU	also	called	for	major	wage	cuts	and	liberalisations	of	its	already	very	flexible	collective	wage
setting	regime.	After	the	abolishment	of	the	provisions	for	binding	sectorial	minimum	wages	and	their	replacement
with	a	more	flexible	regime	in	only	a	small	number	of	sectors,	Ireland	did	not	receive	any	commodifying	CSRs	in	our
field,	as	the	centre-right	Irish	government	made	sure	that	the	austerity	wage	cuts	were	restored	at	such	a	slow	pace
that	they	did	not	cause	any	concern	in	Brussels.	Irish	growth	rates	also	increased	again,	not	as	a	result	of	the
austerity	cutbacks,	but	due	to	the	growth	of	actual	and	transfer	pricing	activities	that	multinational	firms	reported	in
Ireland.	In	turn,	Irish	nominal	Unit	Labour	Cost	(ULC)	increases	for	the	2014-16	period	remained	a	stunning	29.5
per	cent	below	the	upper	ceiling	set	by	the	EU’s	MIP	scoreboard.
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The	German	government,	by	contrast,	received	weak	recommendations	that	point	in	a	decommodifying	direction.
Since	2013,	Germany	has	faced	persistent	calls	to	increase	wages	and	to	increase	transitions	towards	more	stable
forms	of	employment.	This,	however,	is	not	due	to	a	concern	for	the	German	economy	being	besieged	by
precarious	work,	but	because	of	its	position	within	the	EU	economy.	According	to	EU	policy	makers,	German	wage
policy	alone	would	be	able	to	generate	so	much	demand-led	growth	domestically	that	it	would	have	positive	‘spill-
over	effects’	for	the	rest	of	the	EU.	What	on	the	surface	looks	like	a	shift	towards	social	concerns	about	the	wage
moderation	that	has	been	forced	upon	German	workers	since	the	start	of	the	century,	is	in	fact	an	economic
concern	with	the	role	current	account	imbalances	have	played	in	shaping	the	macroeconomy	of	the	EU.
From	NEG	prescriptions	on	wage	retrenchment	to	an	EU	law	on	fair	minimum	wages?
Our	analysis	of	EU	wage	policy	recommendations	between	2009-2019	shows	that	policies	were	mostly	oriented	in
the	direction	of	wage	moderation	or	retrenchment.	This	stems	from	diagnosis	of	the	Euro	crisis	where	growing	unit
labour	costs	were	identified	among	the	main	causes	of	the	increasing	imbalances	among	EU	member	states.	Even
after	the	most	acute	phase	of	the	crisis,	wage	setting	institutions	and	collective	bargaining	still	had	to	be	adapted	to
support	so-called	national	competitiveness.
The	recent	proposal	by	the	new	Commission	on	fair	minimum	wages	in	the	EU	may	signal	new	concern	among	EU
leaders	about	the	fact	that	for	too	many	workers	wages	are	too	low	to	guarantee	a	decent	standard	of	living.	At	the
same	time,	however,	the	ongoing	debate	around	the	Eurozone	budget	also	shows	the	continued	commodifying	bias
of	the	EU’s	new	economic	governance	regime,	as	the	proposed	budget	has	no	stabilisation	function,	but	would
serve	to	reward	member	states	that	implement	‘structural	reforms’	suggested	by	the	Eurogroup.	Therefore,	it
remains	to	be	seen	whether	the	EU’s	conflicting	aim	of	moderating	wages	in	order	to	increase	national
competitiveness	and	giving	workers	fair	wages	providing	a	decent	standard	of	living	can	be	reconciled.
Trade	unions	might	play	a	role	in	this	respect,	pushing	for	an	increase	in	wages	across	Europe.	In	the	absence	of
labour	mobilisations,	there	is	indeed	hardly	a	need	for	social	concertation,	which	means	that	even	moderate	unions
must	complement	the	force	of	their	Keynesian	arguments	with	the	argument	of	force.	Given	the	methodological
nationalism	of	the	EU’s	NEG	regime,	its	inaccessible,	technocratic	language,	and	the	different	policy	directions	of
CSRs	for	countries	at	the	centre	and	periphery	of	the	EU’s	political	economy,	the	politicisation	of	the	supranational
NEG	regime	is	not	easy	in	a	transnational	public	sphere.
However,	considering	the	much	more	uniform	commodification	patters	of	CSRs	on	the	provision	of	public	services
by	comparison	to	the	labour	politics	areas	analysed	in	our	study,	EU	economic	governance	may	be	politicised	by
European	public	service	unions	rather	than	the	manufacturing	unions,	even	if	the	latter	have	been	integrated	in
transnational	production	regimes	for	much	longer.
For	more	information,	see	the	authors’	accompanying	paper	in	the	British	Journal	of	Industrial	Relations
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	authors,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.	The	project	this	article	is	based	on	has	received	funding	from	the	European
Research	Council	(ERC)	under	the	European	Union’s	Horizon	2020	research	and	innovation	programme	(grant
agreement	No	725240);	from	the	EU’s	Jean	Monnet	Chair	programme	(grant	agreement	725240);	and	from	the
Irish	Research	Council.	Featured	image	credit:	©European	Parliament/Pietro	Naj-Oleari	(CC	BY-NC-ND	2.0)
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